The American Law Institute's Reporters'
Study on Enterprise Responsibility for
Personal Injury
Note from the Editors:
In 1986 a number of prominent legal scholars embarked upon a
project commissioned by the American Law Institute to re-examine contemporary tort and personalinjury law. Five years later,
the results of this project came to fruition in a two volume study
entitled Reporters' Study on Enterprise Responsibility for Personal
Injury. After a year's debate within the American Law Institute
about the broad range of issues canvassed by the Study, the Institute's Executive Council endorsed the value of the Study for deliberations about tort reform now going on in both legislative and
judicialforums. However, the Council decided not to have the Institute's membership take a formal position on these policy questions. Instead the American Law Institute has now embarked on a
Restatement (Third) of the existing law of Torts.
For the convenience of our readers, we have reprinted the introductory chapter of each volume of the Study. The Editors of the
San Diego Law Review wish to express our gratitude to the American Law Institute for granting permission to reproduce this
material.
PERSPECTIVES ON THE TORT SYSTEM AND THE LIABILITY CRISIS"

I.

INTRODUCTION

This project was conceived and endorsed by The American Law
Institute in 1986. In that year the United States was in the throes of
a major crisis in its tort litigation/liability insurance system. The
immediate symptoms of the crisis were steep increases in insurance
premiums for the providers of a host of products and services. In just
three years, general (including product) liability premiums shot up
from $6.5 billion to more than $19 billion, and medical malpractice
premiums soared from $2 billion to more than $5 billion. Many

other domains fared even worse when their insurance policies were
t Excerpted from I AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTERS' STUDY ON ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 3-52 (1991). Copyright 1991 by the American Law Institute. Reprinted with permission of the American Law Institute.

cancelled and they were unable to secure substitute coverage (for

environmental damage, for example) at any price.' The popular impression was that the source of the unavailability or unaffordability
of liability insurance was an explosion in tort claims and damage
awards. The prevailing sentiment that something was seriously amiss
in the tort regime moved both the federal and state governments, as
well as numerous private organizations, to commission studies of the
causes of these ailments and proposed solutions for them. In the
years that followed reports regularly appeared describing and prescribing for the problem2 - typically calling for restraints or cutbacks on some aspect or other of tort liability. Many of the proposed
measures were subsequently adopted by one state legislature or
another.

This Report is being presented to The American Law Institute five
years after we began our study. During that period the atmosphere
has changed, becoming significantly calmer. For the last two years3
premiums in many lines of liability insurance have been declining.
More systematic analysis of claims trends has demonstrated either
that there never was a true general explosion in tort litigation, or at
least that any incipient trend has definitely subsided. 4 Indeed, some

1. Popular feelings at the time were vividly displayed by the title of Time Magazine's cover story for March 24, 1986: "Sorry, America, Your Insurance Has Been
Cancelled."
2. Just a partial list includes the two reports of the U.S. Department of Justice's
Tort Policy Working Group, The Causes, Extent and Policy Implications of the Current
crisis in Insurance Availability (1986), and An Update on the Liability Crisis (1987);
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' Report of the Task Force on Medical Liability and Malpractice (1987); the State of New York's Governor's Advisory
Commission on Liability Insurance, Insuring Our Future (1986); the Report of the Massachusetts Governor's Task Force on Liability Issues, Liability in Massachusetts: Towards a Fairer System (1986); the State of Florida'sAcademic Task Forcefor Review
of the Insurance and Tort Systems, Preliminary Fact-Finding Report on Medical Malpractice (1987), and Final Fact-Finding Report on the Insurance and Tort Systems
(1988);from the American Bar Association, The Report of the Special Committee on
the Tort Liability System, Towards a Jurisprudence of Injury (1984), the Report of the
Action Commission to Improve the Tort Liability Insurance System (1989), and the
Report of the Commission on Mass Tort Litigation; from American Insurance Association, Association of Independent Insurers, Property and Casualty Insurance Data and
the Case for Tort Reform (1986); from the American Medical Association, a series of
reports from its Special Task Force on Professional Liability and Insurance, Professional
Liability in the 80's (1984; 1985); and finally, from the Research and Policy Committee
of the Committee for Economic Development (CED), Who Should Be Liable? A Guide
to Policy for Dealing With Risk (1989).
3. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Liability Insurance: Effects of Recent
"Crisis" on Business and Other Organizations (1988); "Costs of Medical Malpractice
Drop After 11-Year Climb", New York Times, June 11, 1989, p. 1 .
4. See, for example, Galanter, "The Day After the Litigation Explosion," 46 Maiyland Law Review 3 (1986); Gifford and Nye, "Litigation Trends in Florida: Saga of a
Growth State," 39 University of FloridaLaw Review 829 (1987); Nye and Gifford, "The
Myth of a Liability Insurance Explosion: An Empirical Rebuttal," 41 Vanderbilt Law
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scholars have depicted a pronounced recent change in judicial attitude against the expansionary trend in tort liability, at least in the
products area.,
The considerably longer time span of this American Law Institute
study has permitted serious scholarly analysis and reflection about
the tort system and related institutions for dealing with disabling injuries. The serendipitous result is that we have had the luxury of
forming our final judgments with a much better perspective on the
overall problem. In our view, both the alarmist concerns expressed
by many observers of the tort system at the height of the crisis6 and
the adamant defenses of the system against all criticism and reform
were equally wrongheaded. It is clear that the crisis has now eased;
the tort system did not spin out of control, and major dislocations
were not visited upon the nation's economic and social life. While
subsequent study and debate have identified certain aspects of health
care or product manufacturing that are hampered by the threat of
tort litigation, we have often been reminded of the vital positive
functions served by tort law-in particular, the compensation and
prevention of serious personal injuries-functions that may be sacrificed when the legal rights of injured victims are reduced.
The events of the mid-eighties now stand out as an especially stark
turn in the litigation/insurance cycle that had manifested itself in
the motor vehicle area in the late sixties, in medical malpractice in
the mid-seventies, and in product liability in the late seventies (and
which recently returned in the motor vehicle setting in a number of
states). Recognition of the cyclical character of this phenomenon offers some comfort: liability premiums may rise, but they also drop,
particularly in real dollar terms. At the same time it should serve as
a reminders that the present respite may itself be only temporary,
that yet another tort crisis may be waiting in the wings. Still, lurking
Review 909 (1988); U.S. General Accounting Office, Product Liability: Extent of "Litigation Explosion" in Federal Courts Questioned (1988); J. Dungworth, Product Liability and the Business Sector: Litigation Trends in Federal Courts (1988); and Rowe,
"American Law Institute Study on Paths to a 'Better Way': Litigation, Alternatives and
Accommodation-Background Papger," 1989 Duke Law Journal 824, 829-47.
5. See Henderson and Eisenberg, "The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An
Empirical Study of Legal Change," 37 UCLA Law Review 479 (1990); But See A.
Havenner, Note Quite a Revolution in ProductsLiability (1990, for a systematic statistical critique of Henderson and Eisenberg's assertion that actual product claims and recoveries have fallen off, irrespective of what has been happening to the law in the appellate
courts.
6. For example, P. Huber, Liability: The Legal Revolution and Its Consequences

(1988).

beneath the surface of this ebb and flow in premium costs are deeper
concerns about the performance of the tort system including the fact
that most of the premium dollar is used up in legal administration
rather than direct compensation of victims, the unavailability of any
insurance coverage for a variety of environmental liability risks, and
the apparent inhibiting effect of the tort threat on the practice of
medicine or product innovation. It is crucial, then, to take advantage
of the present period of relative claim to consider carefully whether
there are improvements to the current regime, both inside tort and
as alternatives to tort, that would afford us a better prospect in the
event we experience the turn of the wheel once more.
II.

THE

Focus

OF THE

ALI

STUDY

Tort law is a vast and complex subject. Even with the luxury of
five years and a dozen participating scholars, we had to narrow considerably the focus of this study. Early on we decided to concentrate
solely on bodily injuries to the person, on the assumption that these
inflict qualitatively different harms on individuals and their families
than do the property damage or lost profits affecting commercial enterprises, or the invasions of reputation and privacy suffered by people at the hands of businesses or government. At the same time,
serious analysis of the law's treatment of disabling personal injuries
required consideration of the other institutions through which society
intervenes for the prevention (through consumer product safety laws,
for example) or the compensation (for instance, through social security disability insurance) of such harms. These neighboring institutions are usually complementary to, and occasionally at odds with,
tort policy.
Even within the field of personal injuries we have narrowed the
focus to disabilities that arise out of product use, medical treatment,
the workplace, and toxic exposures in the environment. For the most
part these harms stem from the modern technology that is the hallmark of much of our private enterprise system. The major omission
from in-depth study in its own right were injuries arising out of the
use of motor vehicles, even though these comprise the bulk of present-day tort litigation.
Along with other researchers7 we saw contemporary tort litigation
as operating in three distinct tiers. The first tier, ordinary accident
litigation, consisted primarily of motor vehicle cases in which individual defendants were sued for isolated events that caused harm to
strangers (by contrast with enterprises sued for systemic behavior
7. In particular, at the RAND Institute for Civil Justice: see Hensler, "Trends in
Tort Litigation: Finds from the Institute for Civil Justice's Research," 48 Ohio Stat Law
Journal 479 (1987).
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causing repeated injuries to their clientele). In the motor vehicle
field-as in occupiers' liability cases, for example-litigation rates,
though substantial, have been stable for the last two decades. Perhaps because of jurors' recognition that they themselves might easily
be the defendants in such suits, damage awards were also relatively
moderate in amount, and at least in real terms have not manifested
any pronounced upward trend.
In recent years popular reaction against premium increases in auto
insurance has generated heated political debate in a number of states
(including California and New Jersey).' No major change sin tort
doctrine have appeared to contribute significantly to that phenomenon; in any event, the general recommendations we make for reform
of the tort system (regarding damages for pain and suffering, for
example) would, when applied to motor vehicle litigation, ameliorate
many of the same deficiencies that manifest themselves in that
context.
When people spoke about a tort crisis five years ago, what they
primarily had in mind were not routine motor vehicle collision or
slip-and-fall cases, but a second tier of high-stakes litigation arising
out of product defects or medical mishaps. These cases involved people who were injured as a result of an encounter with modern technology operated by large and impersonal enterprises. (In the medical
context these cases have an additional emotional impact, because an
individual physician is being sued for the treatment rendered his or
her patient in the hospital.9 ) Not only has there been a steady and
appreciable rise in the number of second-tier tort claims since the
late sixties, but for any given level of physical injury juries are systematically prone to awarding successful claimants much higher
sums of money from the deep pockets of these organizations or their
insurers.1" By the eighties serious qualms were emerging about the
comparatively high administrative cost of providing victims with tort
compensation in these hard-fought, high stakes cases, and about the
seemingly erratic manner in which lay juries second-guessed and
8. That popular reaction is precipitated by receiving the overall bill for one's auto
policy, a significant portion of which stems from collision and theft coverage. For an
illuminating exchange about the sources of and possible cures for problems on the personal injury side of motor vehicle litigation and insurance, see "Symposium on Tort
Law-No-Fault Insurance," 26 San Diego Law Review 977 (1989).
9. See Hubbard, "The Physicians' Point of View Concerning Medical Malpractice: A Sociological Perspective on the Importance of "Tort Reform,'" 23 Georgia Law
Review 295 (1989).
10. A Chin and M. Peterson, Deep Pockets, Empty Pockets: Who Wins in Cook
County Jury Trials? (1985).

found fault with the judgments and actions of physicians, product
designers, and the like.
Even graver concerns arose about the capacity of our centuries-old
tort regime to grapple with a new third tier of litigation. This category involves the "mass" tort of toxic exposure of a large number of
people to a product or environmental hazard that may cause cancers
or other serious illnesses decades later. Although such mass tort episodes have been relatively few in number and their legal treatment is
still in a state of flux, the third tier involves the highest stakes of all.
A single product from a single firm, such as the Dalkon Shield, can
produce tens of thousands of disabling injuries and tort claims, and,
like the asbestos cases, can threaten to swamp the legal system with
several hundred thousand lawsuits around the country. At the same
time, because of the long latency period between initial exposure and
eventual manifestation of diseases such as cancer without a single
standard cause, knotty questions were presented to the tort system
about precisely which product or firm was responsible for a particular victim's present condition or fatality."" And liability insurers,
themselves not much better able than their policyholders to predict
the scope and limits of mass tort liability, displayed greater
12 and
greater reluctance to provide any future coverage against it.
Our focus, then, has been on the two upper tiers of high-stakes
and very-high-stakes litigation, and on what, if anything, should be
done about them. We also decided to set aside one further dimension
of present-day tort litigation, the involvement of the government. Of
course many aspects of government's ordinary activities and liability
parallel those of private actors-malpractice in public hospitals, for
example-and are therefore encompassed in our recommendations
on these topics. But the specific legal responsibilities and immunities
that should be assigned to government as such raise a distinctive set
of concerns about appropriate judicial scrutiny of discretionary risktaking judgments made within the political process.13 To keep our
analysis and debate manageable, we have decided largely to bypass
that terrain.

11. See Brennan, "Causal Chains and Statistical Links: The Role of Scientific Uncertainty in Hazardous Substance Litigation," 73 Cornell Law Review 469 (1988).
12. See Abraham, "Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance," 88 Columbia Law Review 942 (1988).
13. For broader explorations of these problems, see P. Schuck, Suing Government:
Citizen Remedies for Official Wrongs (1983); and Zilhnan, "Congress, Courts and Government Tort Liability: Reflections on the Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act," 1989 Utah Law Review 687.
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III.

SOURCES OF THE TORT CRISIS

A.

The Insurance Regime

Even within the boundaries described above, the appropriate tort
and other legal policy responses to product, medical, workplace, and
environmental injuries have provided more than enough grist for our
mill over the last five years. In order to make sound recommendations for action that would cure any supposed deficiencies within
these areas of the tort system, we first had to arrive at a correct
diagnosis of the underlying problems.
For many observers, an equally plausible candidate for reform is
the liability insurance system. The popular outcry for reform first
arose when people and firms began receiving from their insurers notices of steep premium hikes or even of cancellation of their insurance coverage. The situation was especial intolerable in contexts in
which liability insurance was practically or legally required in order
to engage in the activity in question. Many trial lawyers and consumer groups felt that insurance was not only the symptom but also
the source of the tort "crisis."'' On its face there seemed to be little
logic to a pricing pattern in which sudden sharp increased in premiums were followed two or three years later by plateaus or even declines in insurance rates. A more cynical view was that the price
increases were fostered by collusive arrangements within the insurance industry-an industry that is insulated by the McCarran-Ferguson Act from the full force and effect of antitrust law.15 That,
indeed, was the judgment of a group of states that filed an antitrust
suit against a number of major casualty insurers and the Insurance
Service Office, charging that anticompetitive insurance practices had
exacerbated the shortage or the price of coverage at the height of the
liability crisis. 8
Though we have not undertaken as far-ranging a review of the
14. See, for example, Nader, "The Assault on Injured Victims' Rights," 64 Denver
University Law Review 625 (1988).
15. This argument is made by Angoff, "Insurance Against Competition: How the
McCarran-Ferguson Act Raises Prices and Profits in the Property-Casualty Insurance
Industry," 5 Yale Journal on Regulation 397 (1988). The theoretical plausibility of the
argument is defended by Ayres and Siegelman, "The Economics of the Insurance Antitrust Suits: Towards an Exclusionary Theory," 63 Tulane Law Review 971 (1989). For a
trenchant critique, see Priest, "The Antitrust Suits and the Public Understanding of Insurance," 63 Tulane Law Review 999 (1989).
16. A federal district judge dismissed the suit in the basis of McCarran-Ferguson
Act: see In re Insurance Antitrust Litigation, 723 F. Supp. 464 (N.D. Cal. 1989), though
an appeal is pending.

insurance side of the equation as have more specialized studies,'17 we
have satisfied ourselves about certain crucial points regarding the insurance dimension of the liability crisis. First, it is clear that the
sudden explosion of insurance premiums and the contraction of
available coverage in the mid-eighties was not caused by any immediate events within the legal system, any more than were similar insurance phenomena in the mid-seventies. A variety of technical
explanations-including changes in investment earnings or reductions in the supply of capital in the industry-have been offered for
the peculiar pattern of the insurance cycle, in which sudden upsurges
in price are followed by premiums pauses, followed by another upsurge, and so on.' Taking into consideration the rather unusual
character of the insurance product-liability carriers must price and
sell their coverage before the vast bulk of their "costs of product"
have yet been incurred, and so these costs can only be projected-perhaps the alternating bouts of pessimism and optimism
that seem to overtake the industry should not be surprising.
Later in this Report we analyze these and other explanations for
the sort-term problems that affect the liability insurance system.
Long-term trends in insurance pricing, however, give little credence
to the charge of collusive exploitation. In fact, liability insurance is
one of our least, not most, concentrated industries. Perhaps the McCarrang-Ferguson Act offers some degree of insulation from full
competition to short-term premium setting, but there is no evidence
of abnormal and excessive profits being earned by the industry-nor
any evidence of significant losses, either."9 In addition, the collusion
hypothesis cannot sensibly account for the refusal by participating
firms to sell their product at any price-that is, to refuse insurance
coverage in a number of settings- rather than sell at an unwarrantedly high price. Yet such a refusal tosell is precisely what took place
in the mid-eighties. Most important, careful investigation of longerterm trends has shown that increases in the cost of liability insurance
are validated by trends in underlying tort claims, awards, and legal
expenses.2" At any one time insurance prices lag behind the legal
17. See, for example, the New York State, Florida, and ABA Commission studies
cited in note 2 supra.
18. See the various pieces in the Symposium, "Perspectives on the Insurance Crisis,"
5 Yale Journal of Regulation 367 (1988). For a brief review of this problem by our
Reporter principally responsible for the liability insurance side of our inquiry, see Abraham, "Making Sense of the Liability Insurance Crisis," 48 Ohio State Law Journal399
(1987).
19. As is shown by Harrington, "Prices and Profits in the Liability Insurance Market," in Liability: Perspectives and Policy 42 (R. Litan and C. Winston eds. 1988).
20. See Nye, Gifford, Webb, and Dewar, "The Causes of the Malpractice Crisis:
An Analysis of the Claims Data and Insurance Company Finances," 76 Georgetown Law
Journal 1495 (1988) (presenting the findings of the Florida Academic Task Force); and
the Report of the New York State Insurance Department on Medical Malpractice, A
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system, as in the early eighties, and then jump too far ahead, as in
the mid-eighties; but over the long haul expansions of legal liability
and increases in insurance prices run together. If this longer-term
trend in insurance costs is viewed as a policy problem (a premise
that may or may not be valid), then a search for a solution must
focus on the factors that have been driving tort claims and awards
upward.
B. The Legal Regime
Even a casual reader of the law reports and the law review should
get the impression that the major driving force in the burgeoning of
tort litigation has been the host of common law developments that
have expanded victim rights to tort redress. Most of the highly publicized judicial innovations have involved greater substantive liability
imposed on defendants for their activities. But just as significant
have been numerous changes that have given victims greater access
to the tort process to enforce their rights, and have enlarged the
scope of damages that are recovered once initial liability is
established.
Throughout this Report we will dwell in more detail on these various legal changes. Here we briefly note the highlights.
STRICT PRODUCT LIABILITY. 21 The watershed event in this domain
was generally conceded to be the adoption in the mid-sixties (particularly in Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts) of
strict liability for defective products, followed in the next decade by
steady enlargement of the concept of "defect" to encompass a variety of failings in product design and warnings about use. This development had a major impact not only on tort claims by those injured
as the result of using consumer products in the home, but also by
those hurt in motor vehicles, in the workplace, and while receiving
medical treatment (on account of prescription drugs, for example).
EXPANDING MEDICAL LIABILITY. Although there is no analog to
the Restatement's Section 402A in the field of medical liability, in
Balanced Prescriptionfor Change 68-74 (1988) (arriving at the same conclusion for
New York).
21. For a general appraisal of contemporary product liability law, see Schwartz,
"Prospects for Product Liability Reform," 97 Yale Law Journal 353 (1988); and W.K.
Viscusi, Reforming Products Liability Law (forthcoming, Harvard University Press,
1991) (both originally prepared as ALI Background Papers).

the last two decades there has been a steady accumulation of developments involving such doctrines as the locality rule, informed consent, vicarious or corporate hospital responsibility, and res ipsa
loquitur, all of which added22apparently helpful weapons to the injured patient's legal armory.
BANNING WAVIERS OF LIABILITY. Both product and medical injuries occur in settings in which the parties are in a direct or indirect
contractual relationship. Therefore it is feasible in principle for the
manufacturer or doctor to insist on a contract waiver of these new
forms of tort liability as a condition to delivering the product or service in question. Not surprisingly, though, the judges who considered
it important to enlarge the scope of enterprise responsibility in the
first place were not prepared to countenance frustration of their social policy by individual waivers. Consequently, even the most explicit disclaimers2 3of liability were uniformly struck down as contrary
to public policy.
Toxic CAUSATION. In the late seventies and early eighties a variety of innovations, legal (such as market share liability) as well as
scientific, facilitated identification of long-latency diseases and attribution of the diseases to particular hazardous sources. 24 These developments paralleled the use of the traditional doctrine of joint and
several liability to force one of several defendants to insure the plaintiff-victim against the judgment-proof condition of the party that
was often more directly responsible for the harm.23
LIMITING VICTIM RESPONSIBILITY. The long-established common
law doctrines of contributory negligence and voluntary assumption of
risk historically barred many victim suits against even negligent defendants. But over the past two decades these doctrines have been
either overturned or sharply narrowed. As a result, the prima facie
liability of the culpable defendant is preserved, and responsibility for
the overall harm is shared by the victim and defendant in proportion
22. Medical malpractice law is analyzed and evaluated in P. Weiler, Medical Malpractice in Trial (Harvard University Press, 1991) (originally written as an ALl Background Paper).
23. The bellwether cases were Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69
(N.J. 1960) (products liability); and Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California,
383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963) (medical liability).
24. See Rabin, "Environmental Liability and the Tort System," 24 Houston Law
Review 27 (1987).
25. The conflicts surrounding joint and several liability are highlighted in the spirited debate between Wright, "Allocating Liability Among Multiple Responsible Causes:
A Principled Defense of Joint and Several Liability for Actual Harm and Risk Exposure," 21 U.C. Davis Law Review 1141 (1981); Twerski, "The Joint Tortfeasor Legislative Revolt: A Rational Response to the Critics," 22 U.C. Davis Law Review 1125
(1989); Wright, "Throwing Out the Baby With the Bathwater," 22 U.C. Davis Law
Review 1147; and Twerski, "The Baby Swallowed the Bathwater: A Reply to Professor
Wright," 22 U.C. Davis Law Review 1161.
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to their comparative fault and responsibility."
REASONABLE DISCOVERY PERIODS. Statutes of limitations, strictly

construed, had been used in the past to bar tort claims for long-past
harmful events, the consequences of which were felt or appreciated
by the victim much later. Most courts began to deem such time bars
as running only after the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered a doctor's negligence (such as his having left a sponge in the
body after an operation), or after the harmful effects of a toxic exposure (cancer
in an insulation worker, for example) manifested
27
themselves.
TYPES AND QUANTUM OF DAMAGES.

The average damage award

rose at a much faster rate after the early sixties than did general
wages of prices.2s Perhaps the most important source of this trend
was the great increase in amounts awarded for pain and suffering, in
both traditional situations and in a variety of new categories such as
wrongful death or the psychological distress generated by witnessing
another's injuries.29 In addition, though they were paid in only a minority of cases, punitive damages became a significant phenomenon
in high-stakes product, environmental, and even medical injury
litigation. °
The foregoing developments are among the most prominent doctrinal indicia of the progressively expanding tort agenda. Inevitably
this extensive judicial action produced popular, political, and scholarly reactions. The widespread belief, valid or not, is that judges and
juries have ben accepting and encouraging a host of farfetched
claims that personal injury attorneys translate into huge damage
awards, from which the lawyers then take hefty contingency fees.
Meanwhile, the enterprises that are the targets of this litigation have
26. See Schwartz, "Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal,"
87 Yale Law Journal 697 (1978).
27. See, e.g., McGovern, "The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product
Liability Statutes of Repose," 30 American University Law Review 579 (1981), on both
the initial judicial interpretations and then the legislative revisions.
28. See M. Peterson, Civil Juries in the 1980's: Trends in Jury Trials and Verdicts in California and Cook County, Illinois (1987).
29. See, e.g., Bell, "The Bell Tolls: Towards Full Tort Recovery for Psychic Injury," 36 University of FloridaLaw Review 333 (1984); and Leebron, "Final Moments:
Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior to Death," 64 New York University Law Review
256 (1989).
30. See the various papers in the Symposium on Punitive Damages, in 40 Alabama
Law Review 687 (1989); in particular the piece coauthored by Michael Trebilcock , who
took primary responsibility for our chapter on this subject: Chapman and Trebilcock,
"Punitive Damages: Divergence in Search of a Rationale," 40 Alabama Law Review
789.

been groaning under the burden of spiralling insurance and legal
costs. In the mid-seventies the nation's doctors went to the legislatures for relief; they returned in the mid-eighties, this time in league
with a host of other actors who considered themselves the victims of
unduly generous tort law. Doctors enjoyed considerable success at
the state level,31 but a decade-long effort by the business community
to secure product liability reform at the federal level has so far
proved fruitless.3 2
Without detailing here the content of statutory tort "reform," it is
interesting to observe that none of this legislation overturned any of
the major judicial innovations in substantive liability standards that
we just canvassed (including strict product liability and informed
consent for doctors), although legislatures have whittled away at the
margins of these doctrines (through adoption of a "state of the art"
product liability defense, for example, and use of the "reasonable
physician" rather than the "reasonable patient" standard for doctor
disclosure sufficient to secure informed consent). Instead, legislators
have concentrated the bulk of their efforts on restricting the plaintiff's initial access to the tort process (through devices such as statutes of repose that place outer limits on the discovery period, and
limits on attorney fees that make riskier claims less viable) or ont he
eventual scope of damages payable for successful claims (through
collateral source offsets or caps on pain and suffering awards). Needless to say, statutory limits on the ultimate payoff from a case also
exert a significant influence eon the likelihood that a claim will initially be filed and pursued.
C. Tort Law in a Broader Perspective
It is natural for legislators, judges, lawyers, and legal scholars to
suppose that the new doctrinal concepts they debate, adopt, and revise have played the major role in expanding tort litigation and increasing insurance premiums. Yet there is considerable reason for
skepticism on that score. In the field of medical malpractice, a number of empirical studies have assessed the impact of legal
rules-both judge-made common law and statutory reforms-on tort
claims, awards, and premiums. 33 The consistent finding of this work
31. See Bovbjerg, "Legislation on Medical Malpractice: Further Developments
and a Preliminary Report Card," 22 U.C. Davis Law Review 499 (1989).
32. For analyses from somewhat different perspectives of the content of the federal
legislative program(s), see Twerski, "A Moderate and Restrained Federal Product Liability bill: Targeting the Crisis Areas for Resolution," 18 Journal of Law Reform 575
(1985); and Schwartz and Hashigian, "A Permanent Solution for Product Liability Crises: Uniform Federal Product Law Standards," 64 Denver University Law Review 685
(1988).
33. Because malpractice legislation has been the most extensive, varied, and long-
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is that the specific content of medical liability standards has only a
marginal influence eon aggregate tort trends, much less than the influence exerted by direct restraints on initial plaintiff access to the
system, or especially by limits on the size of awards in successful
claims.
A number of commentators have expressed a contrary view about
the significance of doctrine in the product liability field. In this field
there was a major doctrinal revolution-the move from fault to strict
liability-which supposedly led to an explosion in tort claims and
thence to an unraveling of the liability insurance pool, culminating in
the widespread unavailability, let alone affordability, of insurance
coverage in the mid-eighties.3 4
Viewed in a broader perspective, however, the attempt to link
these doctrinal, litigation, and insurance events seems dubious. First,
close examination of product liability law itself reveals that this
brand of liability is based far more on "fault" then it initially appears to be. The largest and most troublesome growth area has involved claims of "defective" design and warnings, for which the legal
standard still smacks of traditional fault-the absence of reasonable
precautions that properly balance such product ingredients as risk,
cost, and benefits in the context of the current state of the art. Similarly, although medical malpractice law remains explicitly wedded to
fault (determined by reference to standards set by doctors, not jurors), health care providers have experienced equally steep increases
in claims and premiums, though without an unraveling of their insurance pools. Most importantly, comparing either of these aspects
of tort law to workers' compensation, a no-fault liability regime in
the purest sense of the term, reveals a comparable increase in workers' compensation aggregate costs over the last several decades.
However, while serious concerns about rising claims and

lived of the tort reforms enacted in the last two decades, it has produce the most revealing results. See Danzon, "The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice
Claims: New Evidence," 49 Law and Contemporary Problems 57 (Spring, 1986); and
Sloan, Mergenhagen, and Bovbjerg, "Effects of Government Reform on the Value of
Closed Medical Malpractice Claims: A Microanalysis," 14 Journal of Health Politics,
Policy and Law 663 (1989). More recently, serious work has begun on state product
liability changes: see Viscusi, "The Performance of Liability Insurance in States With
Different Product Liability Standards," 19 Journalof Legal Studies 809 (1990).
34. This is a recurrent theme, for example, in the Report of the Committee for
Economic Development, Who Should Be Liable?, supra note 2. The most prominent
scholarly exposition of this thesis is Priest, "The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern
Tort Law," 96 Yale Law Journal 1521 (1987).

clots-involving such new concepts as cumulative trauma or occupational stress-exist in the workers' compensation realm, there has
not been the sense of recurrent crisis that regularly overtakes tort
law.35 The big difference in workers' compensation is that however
broad and inviting may be its standards of entitlement and liability,
there are real constraints on the amount of compensation that will be
awarded in any one case. This factor has permitted much smoother
and more controlled expansion in aggregate expenditures within the
workers' compensation system.
The foregoing are some of the reason we devote as much attention
in this Report to the legal principles governing tort damages as the
rules that define initial liability. But we must still address the objection of the critic who argues that whatever the explanation, the expansion of the role of tort litigation (as well as tort doctrine) over
the last quarter-century has been perverse, especially in view of the
fact that the real world appears to be growing safer rather than
more hazardous.
The fallacy in that point is its assumption that because the world
is getting safer, a growing propensity to sue must mean that people
are increasingly filing spurious tort claims. Yet on the contrary a
recent nationwide survey by the RAND Institute for Civil Justice 30
found that far more people were injured than ever considered suing,
and that most people who entertained the idea of litigation eventually never pursued it, particularly in the highstakes fields of product,
workplace, medical, or environmental injuries. (The inclination to
sue is considerably higher for motor vehicle accidents.) Nor is this
reluctance to bring a lawsuit due to the fact that the victim has no
one but himself to blame for injury. The recent Harvard study of
medical injuries in New York 37 found that only a small fraction of
patients who suffered disabling injuries resulting from the negligence
of a doctor or other health care provider ever filed a tort claim, and
that less than half of these claims succeeded in producing a settlement or award. It is clear, then, that the recent growth in tort litigation has served only to narrow the always wide gap between actual
35. On the rise in workers' compensation claims and premiums during the post-war
period, see Price, "Workers' Compensation: 1976-80 Benchmark Revisions," 47 Social
Security Bulletin 3 (July, 1984); and Nelson, "Workers' Compensation Coverage, Benefits, and Costs, 1986," Social Security Bulletin 34 (March, 1989).
36. See D. Hensler et al., Accidents and Injuries in the U.S.: Costs, Compensation
and Claiming Behavior (forthcoming 1991). The findings of the RAND study are surprisingly in accord with the results from the Oxford Study for the much less litigious
United Kingdom: D. Harris et aL, Compensation and Support for Illness and Injury
(1984).
37. See Harvard Medical Practice Study Group, Patients, Doctors, and Lawyers:
Medical Injury, MalpracticeLitigation, and Patient Compensation in New York (1990)
[Harvard Study].
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negligent injuries and successful suits for those injuries, not to overshoot that gap.
What are the reasons for this steady increase in tort (workers'
compensation) claims over the past several decades? Change sin the
governing legal standards, particularly the standards for tort damages rather than for substantive liability, have certainly had some
impact. Major social influences are the fact that seeing a lawyer and
filing a tort claim are now much more acceptable, and that people
feel more entitled to a higher level of protection against bodily injury
both before and after an accident occurs. In addition, the personal
injury bar, aided by the scientific community, has developed a
greater capacity to identify the connection between a victim's injury
and an enterprise's risk activity, as well as to establish this connection to the satisfaction of a jury. To the extent that these practical
social factors"8 have provided the greatest impetus to rising tort litigation and insurance premiums, in future years were are likely to
experience more, not less, of the same trends.
IV.

THE AIMS AND LIMITS OF TORT LAW

The mere fact that the number of real injuries is greater than the
number of legal claims is not sufficient to justify the continuing expansion of tort law. We must also be satisfied that the litigation arising from these injuries contributes something of real value to the
personal injury problem. One reason that such a question mark
hangs over the current tort regime is that no clear consensus exists
about the objectives the system is supposed to serve. A number of
plausible rationales are regularly advanced, but upon close analysis
each reveals flaws of principle or of fact. Moreover, the effort by tort
law to secure several of these objectives at once is a source of continual tension in the system's operation.
A.

Corrective Justice

The simplest and most venerable justification for tort liability is
that it secures the value of corrective justice.39 In this account, a
38. Elaborated in Rabin, "Tort Law in Transition: Tracing Patterns of Sociolegal
Change," 23 Valparaiso University Law Review 1 (1988).
39. For illuminating treatments of the contemporary tort debate from this perspective, see Weinrib, "Understanding Tort Law," 23 ValparaisoUniversity Law Review 485
(1989); Smith, "The Critics and the 'Crisis': A Reassessment of current Conceptions of
Tort law," 72 Cornell Law Review 765 (1987); Schroeder, "Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks," 37 UCLA Law Review 439 (1990); and Wright, "Allocating

lawsuit is pictured as a contest between two individuals, a reflection
of their bipolar relationship in the real world in which the defendant
caused the plaintiff to suffer an injury. Assume that the defendant's
actions evidenced an unreasonable preference for this own interests
and insufficient regard for the risk that actions created to the plaintiff's rights. If the risk then materializes, under this theory it is only
fair to require that the defendant make the plaintiff whole for the
injuries suffered, so that the defendant will shoulder the burden of
the losses produced by his own misconduct.4
From the corrective justice perspective, the fact that victims are
provided with compensation for past losses and defendants supplied
with incentives for future care is a fortuitous byproduct, not the central rationale, for tort liability. The crucial defining feature of this
liability regime-extending compensation only to victims harmed by
someone else's fault, and determining the size of the damage award
by the victim's losses, not the degree of defendant culpability-are
the legal implications of the community's effort to restore the preexisting relationship between the two parties, a relationship that was
unjustly disturbed by one party's misconduct and the resulting injury
to the other.
Although this corrective justice rationale continues to maintain its
hold ont eh popular mind and to have important scholarly exponents,
its premises have become progressively less resonant with the real
world of tort litigation. One particular problem is that the actor who
was at fault does not actually pay for the victim's injuries. Instead,
the damages are ordinarily paid by the enterprise employing the actor or by the insurance company that provides liability coverage to
the actor or firm. More importantly, in situations such as product,
medical, or workplace injuries, in which victims and injurers are in
some kind of contractual relationship, much of the financial burden
of tort liability is ultimately borne by potential victims themselves in
the prices they pay for the products or services that create the risks,
or in wages foregone by employees who take more hazardous jobs
that have this type of liability insurance attached to them. A verdict
in court may formally reflect the tenets of corrective justice in the
way it allocates legal responsibility between the two immediate parties to the lawsuit. However, the court award is simply a symbolic
starting point for the allocation of financial responsibility that eventually works itself out in the world beyond the courtroom.

Liability Among Multiple Responsible Causes," note 25 supra.
40. In cases in which the victim's fault contributed to his own injuries, this creates
a bar to, or more recently and more properly, a proportional sharing of, legal responsibility for the injury.
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B.

Social Grievance Redress

The fact that large corporate enterprises are the real defendants in
most high-stakes tort litigation has exacerbated rather than allayed
the sense of social grievance that such cases produce. The community fervently wishes to see these grievances redressed in some fashion or other. Perhaps the most revealing manifestation of this
popular sentiment is the increasing incidence of sizable punitive
damage awards over the last two decades.4" Juries and judges see
large organization abusing their power through systematic endangerment of large segments of the population, not simply in sporadic injuries to a few individuals. At the same time, skepticism proliferates
about the willingness of the executive branches of government to
control abuses of corporate power, in part because of a perceived
symbiotic relationship between the private and public bureaucracies.
The populist goal of tort litigation, then, is to empower the private
42
citizen to act as an effective one-person lobby against such abuses.
The victim (or group of victims) hires a lawyer to investigate and
uncover the malfeasance in question and to hale the offender into
court, where the "outrageous misconduct"4' 3 can by publicly displayed. The victim then invites a jury of his peers to send a message
to the malefactor as well as to the other potential defendants in the
form of a multimillion-dollar damage award.
Unquestionably there is something satisfying about a process that
allows ordinary people to put "authority in the dock"4 4 and hold it to
account for such human tragedies as asbestos exposure, DES, or the
fallout from nuclear testing. Whether the authority held liable is actually the responsible party in these high-profile suits is, however,
open to question. Generally it turns out that the individuals in the
public and private organizations who made the original risky decisions have long departed from the scene by the time the risks they
took materialize decades later in the form of disability, death, and
litigation. Those who end up paying the bill for lawsuits over the
41. See M. Peterson, S. Sarma, and M. Shanley, Punitive Damages: Empirical
Findings (1987), for both the trends and patterns in punitive damage awards.
42. For explorations in that vein, see Zacharias, "The Politics of Torts," 95 Yale
Law Journal 698 (19860; and Linden, "Tort Law as Ombudsman," 51 Canadian Bar
Review 155 (1973).
43. This is the title of the well-known book by Paul Brodeur on the role played by
tort litigation in uncovering the asbestos disaster.
44. See Hazard, "Authority in the Dock," 69 Boston University Law Review

(1989).

earlier misconduct are the present shareholders, employees, and customers of the private firm (or taxpayers of the government). The
financial burden is distributed among these groups in a manner determined by the intersection of the capital, labor, and product markets within which the firm functions. Just as was true of the
corrective justice rationale for tort liability, proponents of the populist justification for tort litigation as a manes of redressing social
grievances must eventually fact the facts of the hefty burden imposed by litigation and the often great distance between those whose
actions trigger the suit and those who must eventually pay the bill.
When they do, the need for a more pragmatic justification of our
tort litigation/liability insurance system becomes evident. Is there
any good reason to believe that the costs of litigation will prove to be
a socially worthwhile investment in this technique for ameliorating
the personal injury problem?
C. Compensation/Risk Distribution
One accomplishment of tort law that can be directly observed is
the transfer of money from the defendant to the injured victim. We
can be generally confident that defendant enterprises or insurers will
distribute the burden of this compensation award across broader segments of the community in the prices paid for risky products or activities. Public finance and social welfare policy make the plausible
assumption that modest additional costs borne by a large number of
people are less burdensome than catastrophic losses falling on individual victims and families. Under this view the mandatory spreading of the risk of seriously disabling injuries through the imposition
of tort liability reduces the aggregate social cost of injuries.
The theory of risk spreading through enterprise tort liability took
root in the scholarly community in the fifties. It is commonly believed to have been the major influence in the expansion of tort liability from the mid-sixties onward. 45 At the same time, social
insurance against health care costs and earnings losses was increasingly pictured as essential in the popular and political debates of that
era. Yet as it turned out there were serious obstacles to either private or public adoption of a comprehensive social insurance program
in the United States. Understandably, then, judges who believed that
risk distribution was desirable but who could see the gaps and limitations in the country's existing social safety net were inclined to use
the occasion of litigation over serious injuries to expand the reach of
45. See Priest, "The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of Modem Tort Law," 14 Journal of Legal Studies 461 (1985), tracing the influence especially
of Fleming James, the most prominent advocate of the compensation/risk distribution
role for tort law.
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third-party tort liability to fill the insurance gaps.46
With the luxury of our historical perspective on the enterprise liability movement, we can identify the considerable flaws of tort law
as a source of disability insurance, especially a tort system whose
formal rules of liability and entitlement
are still largely based on the
47
historic corrective justice rationale.
1. FAULT-LIMITED. Entitlement to compensation is based on the
fortuitous fact that some other actor is at fault in causing the injury,
not on the fact that the injury creates immediate needs on the part
of the victim. In addition, any contribution of the victim's fault to
the injury traditionally served as a bar to any tort recovery; now it
generally provides a rationale for reducing the amount of the recovery, again without regard to the real current needs of the victim and
family.
2. OVERGENEROUS. Once the plaintiff manages to establish the de-

fendant's fault, the plaintiff collects full compensation for all his
losses, whether or not there is a real need for such insurance. In
other words, if the victim's losses are financial, he recovers irrespective of whether first-party insurance has or would cover the same
losses. If the victim's losses are psychological, he recovers irrespective of whether there is any social value in transferring insurance
monies to cover an inherently nonmonetary loss.
3. REGRESSIVE. Even with respect to uninsured financial losses, be-

cause tort law focuses on the fact and size of the victim's injury
viewed ex post, the amount of compensation provided is based on the
size of the victim's prior earnings, however high or low they may be,
in marked contrast tor the frankly redistributive character of explicit
social insurance programs such as SSDI. But unlike private disability or life insurance, for which higher earners pay larger premiums
in return for greater income protection, mandatory tort "insurance"
is financed through regressive fiat-rate assessments incorporated in
the prices of products or services that are charged to everyone, rich
and poor alike.
46. For a systematic presentation of the judges' success (or social security's failure), see O'Connell and Guinivan, "An Irrational Combination: The Relative Expansion
of Liability Insurance and Contraction of Loss insurance," 49 Ohio State Law Journal
757 (1989).
47. Systematic critiques of tort compensation from differing points of view include
S. Sugarman, Doing Away with Personal Injury Law (1989), Chapter 2; Epstein, "Products Liability as an Insurance Market," 14 Journal of Legal Studies 645 (1985); and
Priest, "Modern Tort Law and Its Reform," 22 Valparaiso University Law Review 1
(1987).

4. EXPENSIVE. Third-party tort insurance is extremely expensive to
administer. Individualized decisions must be made about each defendant's fault and each plaintiff's losses, using all the procedural
paraphernalia of the civil justice system. As a result, most of the
claims expenditure dollar pays for administration rather than ending
up in the hands of the victim. This administrative share is significantly greater in high-stakes product, medical, or environmental litigation than in routine motor vehicle litigation, and is several times
the percentage expended in first-party medical and disability insurance, public or private.
D.

Incentives for Prevention

For these reasons, the use of tort law as a device for expanding
insurance protection against disabling injuries is increasingly viewed
as a questionable enterprise. For at least the last decade the focus of
most tort scholars has turned from the compensation of past injuries-a job most consider is best left to loss insurance mechanisms
explicitly designed for that purpose-to the creation of liability incentives for the prevention of future injuries.4 8
From this perspective the function of tort litigation is to force actors who cause injuries (at least avoidable injuries) to pay for the
cost of the injuries in order to generate a financial motive for future
actors to adopt appropriate safety precautions. Tort law has certain
special virtues in this effort. It relies on the incentive of private victims' seeking substantial damage awards to identify and prove the
liability of others who were responsible for their injuries. IT also
measures the size of the sanction imposed for a defendant's misconduct by reference to the actual harm done to its victims. Potential
accident costs thus become salient in the deliberations of potential
defendants about whether a particular safeguard really is optimal-whether the extra safety protection is worth the costs it will
add to the product or service in question. In a fault-based liability
system, risks judged not worth preventing are left to be borne by the
victim. In a strict liability system, the expense of even unavoidable
injuries is also shifted to the enterprise. Here the expectation is that
incorporating the real social costs into the price of inevitably risky
activities will reduce the amount of the activity demanded in the
short run and create a financial incentive for firms to devise new
precautions that will be feasible and worthwhile in the long run.
48. See generally S. Shavell, An Economic Analysis of Accident Law (1987); and
W. Landes and R. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law 91987). As the work of
these scholars exemplifies, the economic approach to tort also pays considerable attention
to the capacity of this institution to deliver efficient insurance for as well as optimal
prevention of personal injuries.

390

[VOL 30: 371, 1993]

Perspectives on the Tort System
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

That, in any event, is the generally prevailing scholarly theory
about the appropriate role of tort law. Many are still skeptical about
how material tort liability is to accident prevention efforts, particularly in the context of motor vehicle or medical malpractice injuries.
In these settings, argue the skeptics, widespread liability insurance
provides a buffer between the tort award and the individually culpable driver or doctor. Even if defendants are subject to certain uninsured consequences when they are sued and found liable, the actions
judged to be at fault are typically cases of momentary, often inadvertent, slips and mistakes that are hardly likely to be influenced by
the prospect of litigation years later. Yet however plausible this
counterargument may be, there is evidence of at least some deterrent
value in motor vehicle and medical malpractice litigation.4 9 In any
event these objections do not apply to much of the high-stakes litigation conducted against corporate enterprises for product, workplace,
or environmental injuries. In those settings either the firm is selfinsured or its insurance is merit-rated, and the target of litigation
will often be deliberate, consciously planned judgments about
whether to build a safeguard into a product or activity, precisely the
that can and will take account of legaltype of enterprise decision
50
financial incentives.
Even in that context, of course, there is a huge gap between the
promise and performance of tort law. On the one hand, in the medical and environmental settings, where it is difficult to identify the
cause and the source of an injury, there are far fewer claims and
awards than injuries, and thus deterrence is far less than optimal.
On the other hand, in areas where the cause of injury may be clear
(such as a motor vehicle or a prescription drug), there is no guarantee that the jury will make the appropriate judgment about whether
the manufacturer could and should have avoided the injury, rather
than hold the victim or a third party (such as a driver or a doctor)
responsible. Many assert that juries are inclined to find some way to
compensate the severely injured plaintiff they see before them in the
courtroom, and that they are prone to overplay the risks relative to
49. D. Dewees and M. Trebilcock, The Efficacy of the Tort System: A Review of
the Empirical Evidence (ALI Background Paper, 1991), Chapter 2, contains a careful
review of what we know about the potential of and experience with tort liability as a
mechanism for reducing motor vehicle injuries. The Harvard Study, supra note 37,
presents findings of a modest preventive effect of malpractice litigation on negligent medical injuries. Se Chapter 13 below for a summary of this research.
50. See Latin, "Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability," 73 California Law Review 677 (1985).

the benefits of the product involved in the injury. If so, a tort system
that can produce multimillion-dollar awards in such cases will in fact
generate far too much deterrence against the enterprises and industries that American society vitally needs (if only to protect us from
what may be even more serious background risks that are not readily
visible in any single legal contest)."
V. A PLURALISTIC PERSONAL INJURY UNIVERSE
Anyone conducting a fair-minded review of trands and analyses
over the last several decades would have to concede the flaws in tort
law's performance. A special challenge faced by tort is that as the
original policy instrument for handling personal injuries, it is expected to perform the broad variety of roles we have noted. A particular source of its difficulties is the fact that these tort functions are
often in a state of internal tension. 2
For example, suppose we calculate a make-whole damage award
designed to impose on the defendant the full social costs of its negligence in order to create optimal incentives for future precautions.
We thereby mandate levels of insurance for victims that may provide
considerably more generous compensation than is appropriate for injuries that have already occurred. Similarly, to the extent that we
ask juries to review painstakingly the culpability of each individual
defendant (or plaintiff) in order to mete out corrective justice between them, we create an administratively expensive mode of injury
compensation and prevention, the costs of which serve as a barrier to
a great many claimants whose injuries merit attention.
One obvious response to these dilemmas is to stop using only one
policy instrument-tort law-to serve multiple goals that are often
conflicting, such that the more we succeed with respect to one goal,
the more we must sacrifice with respect to another. 3 Instead we
might employ a variety of devices, each tailored to the particular
role that is parceled out to it. A number of alternatives to tort law
have in fact been used with progressively greater frequency to respond to perceived deficiencies in tort. Given our experience with
each of these contenders, however, it is not clear that any of them
51. Or at least os it is argued by commentators such as Peter Huber: see his
"safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts,"
85 Columbia Law Review 277 91985). For a critique of Huber's argument, see Rosenberg, "Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means," 62
Indiana Law Journal 562, 575-79 (1987).
52. For an extended exploration of this problem, see Trebilcock, "The Social Insurance-Deterrence Dilemma of Modern North American Tort Law," 24 San Diego Law
Review 929 (1987).
53. For an extended exploration of this problem see Trebilcock, "The Social Insurance-Deterrence Dilemma of Modern North American Tort Law," 24 San Diego Law
Review 929 (1987).
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performs appreciably better than the tort system.
A.

No-Fault Liability

One prominent alternative to tort is the no-fault model of liability,
which first put down roots in workers' compensation for employment
injuries. 4 No-fault is also the major instrument for handling servicerelated injuries to veterans of the armed forces. More recently it has
been employed on a limited basis to compensate for motor vehicle
and medical injuries.
The no-fault concept embedded in such administrative compensation systems is far more searching than anything tort lawyers have
ever envisioned with strict liability for "defective" (that is, faulty)
products. For example, if an employee is injured as a result of a
hazard that was not even known, let alone preventable at the time of
the injury, no "state of the art" defense will be available to the employer to avoid a workers' compensation claim. Workers' compensation (and veterans' benefits) dispense entirely with the moralistic
overtones of traditional tort/ fault liability. Their objectives are entirely functional in character: securing a better blend of compensation for past injuries, and preventing future injuries at a more
economic administrative cost. The benefit structures focus on the economic losses suffered by the average worker rather than on the
higher earnings of some or the pain and suffering of all injured
workers-the pain and suffering category being considered a dubious
candidate for mandatory insurance. Although the system does not
purpose to investigate and judge whether any particular injury
should have been avoided, it does assign the financial responsibility
for all occupational injuries to the employer. The employer is considered to have the best opportunity (or at least the greatest purely
financial incentive) to reduce the risk of such injuries, either by insisting on appropriate personal precautions from its employees or by
investing in safeguards that automatically guard against human error when it does occur. 5
However appealing no-fault might appear as an ideal, there is no
54. P. Wiler, Legal Policyfor Workplace Injuries (ALI Background Paper, 1986),
canvasses the accomplishments and failings of the no-fault workers' compensation system. See also Chapter 3 below.
55. M. Moore and W.K. Viscusi, Compensation Mechanisms for Job Risks:
Wages, Workers' Compensation, and Product Liability (1990), find that workers' compensation has had a pronounced preventive effect, reducing workplace fatalities alone by
more than 25 percent of the level they would otherwise have reached.

denying the major flaws in the realization of the concept in workers'
compensation in the United Stats. One major failing has been the
political determination of benefit levels. For the many workers who
suffer short-term temporary disabilities, the level of (after-tax) income replacement is often extremely generous; consequently, it induces measurable increases in the number of reported injuries and
the duration of time spent receiving compensation payments. However, severe statutory constraints limit the adequacy of support for
the much smaller number of victims of serious permanently disabling
or fatal injuries. Added to this problem is the great difficulty of identifying and attributing the causes of certain disabilities to the workplace, especially long latency conditions or diseases such as chronic
back trouble or cancer. Because an individual firm or insurer has an
incentive to fight liability in the more expensive cases, and because
this difficult causal issue exists to fight about, lawyers and legal procedures are sued far more often than the early exponents of workers'
compensation ever anticipated. At the end of seven a successful
struggle, the disabled worker or his surviving dependents can look
forward to only the modest payoff of a fixed pension that is typically
not adjusted for years of subsequent inflation.
The best test of the perceived inadequacy of workers' compensation in America is that so many injured employees have, in effect,
voted against the system by filing third-party tort actions against the
manufacturers of products used in the workplace. Such employee
suits include many of the most costly claims in the surge of product
litigation over the last two decades.5" In Chapters 15 and 16 we explore the possible uses of administrative no-fault as an alternative
liability model in such areas as medical injuries, but we do so fully
aware of the imperfections of that legal instrument, just as we were
mindful of the flaws in the tort system it might replace.
B. Private Contracts
The fact that many injured workers find the tort/fault regime
more attractive than no-fault workers' compensation doe snot establish that either mode of liability is beneficial to society as a whole.
Recent years have seen a revival of interest in a no-liability optionprivate contracting within competitive markets. 57 This option is not
56. See Weiler, "Workers' Compensation and Product Liability: The Interaction of
a Tort and Non-Tort Regime," 50 Ohio State Law Journal 825 (1989). Of course, that
worker "vote" was often aided by the fact that workers' compensation had extended its
more limited benefits to allay the immediate burden of the disability, and from the base
of support it was much easier to pursue vigorously the ultimately more valuable tort
claim.
57. Unquestionably, Richard Epstein has been the major exponent of the virtues of
freedom of contracting about the risks of personal injury in his writings about product,
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viable for injuries inflicted by an actor on strangers (in Tier I motor
vehicle or certain Tier III environmental exposure cases, for example); however, no-liability is feasible in a number of important injury
settings-not only workplace injuries, but also medical and product
injuries in which actors and victims are in some kind of bargaining
relationship, even if only through an intermediary. Indeed, in the
nineteenth century contract law was the primary determinant of responsibility for such injuries, until it was displaced from the workplace in the early twentieth century in favor of mandatory workers'
compensation and was judicially routed from the product and medical areas in the last three decades.
As we near the twenty-first century, it is not at all obvious that
tort policy is universally preferable. One major advantage of contract
is that it cuts back sharply on the administrative cost of trying to
define and enforce mandatory liability rules from the outside. The
immediate sacrifice, of course, is the loss of the positive value of
compensation and prevention secured by those legal rules. Yet nearly
two decades of law and economics analysis have (again) demonstrated why the last proposition is at best a half-truth. In competitive
markets, potential victims (such as consumers, workers, or patients)
must be offered compensating price or wage differentials to induce
them to encounter greater risks. This additional expense to the enterprise, forcing it to internalize ex ante the cost of these accidents,
generates a financial incentive to reduce the level of risk where doing
so is a reasonable option, and puts additional funds in the pockets of
potential victims to purchase insurance protection against disabling
injuries that still occur.
Not only is it plausible to suppose that there will often be sufficient comparison shopping by a critical mass of potential victims to
make such markets for risks reasonably competitive,5 but we now
have a significant body of empirical evidence which demonstrates
that these markets function with considerable power.5 9 Indeed, compensating wage differentials for the risk of workplace injury alone
occupational, and medical liability. For an extended examination of the pros and cons
market for medical injuries, see Bovbjerg and Havighurst, eds., "Medical Malpractice:
Can the Private Sector Find Relief?" 49 Law and Contemporary Problems 1 (Spring,
1987), including the piece by Epstein at 201.
58. See Schwartz and Wilde, "Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract
Terms: The Examples of Guarantee and Security Interests," 69 Virginia Law Review
1387, 1402-20 (1983).
59. See, for example, Priest, "A Theory of the Consumer Warranty," 90 Yale Law
Journal 1297 (1981).

are on the order of $100 billion a year, roughly the same as the cost
of workers' compensation and tort liability together. And a major
virtue of market-determined contracts is that they leave decisions
about the expenditure of these funds up to the private parties themselves: the enterprise decides whether certain precautions are optimal, given their costs, and victims decide whether certain levels of
insurance are worthwhile, given alternative uses of the funds.
The authors of this Report believe that market does impose significant constraints on risky activities, and we will propose a number of
techniques for enhancing and reinforcing market incentives. But we
are satisfied that the following limits and imperfections 0 in the functioning markets are great enough that we would decline any invitation to reassume the nineteenth-century posture of untrammeled
freedom of contract regarding the risk of personal injury.
1. INFORMATION. Contrary to the opinion of some lawmakers,
Americans are reasonably well informed about the risk of something
going wrong and their getting hurt when they buy and use a car, for
example, or got to work at a construction site, or go into a hospital
for an operation. Moreover, to the extent that people incorrectly estimate the precise level of risk, they are as likely to overestimate as to
underestimate the odds. On the other hand, individuals are much
less likely to have accurate information about the relative risks posed
by different individual producers of cars, suppliers of construction
work, or hospital operating teams; yet it is this comparative information that is crucial for directing the appropriate market signals at
competing enterprises.

2. INTERMEDIARIES. Even when the government takes steps to force
greater dissemination of relative risk data than the free market
would provide on its own-in the workplace or regarding health
care, for example-people must still rely on appraisal of this information by intermediaries: on the employer's decision about which
machine tools to purchase or the doctor's judgment about which
drugs to prescribe. Although these intermediaries have good reasons
to try to make the appropriate decisions on behalf of their constituents, they also have competing interests of their own, and the need to
rely on the intersection of these overlapping markets adds to the likelihood of malfunctioning incentives.
3. EXIT COSTS. Individuals often gain their best appreciation for
risks only after they have had sufficient contact and experience with
them-as an employee on a job, as a patient with a doctor, as a
consumer who purchases and uses a car. But having once made a
60. See W.K. Viscusi, Risk by Choice: Regulating Health and Safety (1983); and
W.K. Viscusi and W. Magat, Learning About Risk: Consumer and Worker Responses to
Hazard Information (1987), for analytical and empirical discussion of both the promise
and the limits of the markets for risk.
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commitment, these people face significantly greater costs if they act
on the more accurate information by choosing to leave unduly hazardous jobs, doctors, or cars. These additional exit costs reduce the
market incentives trained on providers to establish appropriate risk
levels from the outset.
4. SOCIAL ALTRUISM. For these and other reasons, markets for risk
function imperfectly (though, we reiterate, often more effectively
than is commonly supposed). But a final reason for public policy intervention is the strongly held sentiment that the community should
not automatically accept whatever happens to be the outcome of
even an optimally functioning market for life and limb. Suppose that
fully informed consumers, selecting from a variety of options, choose
to drive a more dangerous car or to work on a more hazardous job
site, and then spend whatever premium they get in prices or wages
on a variety of other more attractive goods or services than health or
disability insurance-all on the optimistic assumption that they will
escape the odds of being hurt. For a host of social and political reasons that have ben debated throughout this century,"' the American
polity is simply not prepared to allow individuals to take whatever
type and magnitude of risks they may choose with respect to their
own lives, with the inevitable impact that doing so can have on family members and the rest of us who will feel obligated to look after
the victims if something goes wrong.62 That sentiment regularly
moves policy makers, be they judges or legislators, to insist upon
some minimum level of injury prevention and compensation, irrespective of whether that level would be chosen by everyone in the
marketplace.
C. Loss Insurance

Still unanswered is the question of what is the best instrument to
use in controlling market contracting.63 Some argue that we must
61. A recent systematic restatement of the scholarly case for government intervention is C. Sustein, After the Rights Revolutiorn Reconceiving the Regulatory State
(1990), in particular Chapters 1 and 2. Comparable conclusions are reached from very
different point on the intellectual spectrum by Jackson, "The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law," 98 Harvard Law Review 1393 (1985); and Kennedy, "Distributive and
Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory
Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power," 41 Maryland Law Review 563 (1982).
62. For a brief appraisal of that sentiment, see Chapters 7 and 8 below.
63. Indeed, it is possible to use suitably restrained modes of contracting to try to
remedy some of the flaws in existing tort litigation For imaginative proposals along those
lines, see O'Connell, "Neo-No-Fault: A Fair Exchange Proposal for Tort Reform," in
New Directions in Liability Law 186 (W. Olson ed. 1988) (contracting after the injury);
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cut back sharply on legal liability (either the tort or the no-fault
version), with its inevitably imperfect blend of compensation and
prevention, and use instead two distinct instruments-commandand-control regulation for injury prevention and first-party loss insurance for compensation. 4
There can be no doubt that if we focus solely on the compensation
objective, then loss insurance is preferable to liability insurance.
That is why the major expansion of the former type of coverage
(both public and private) over the last half-century has proven so
attractive.
With loss insurance, payments to the injured victim do not turn on
the fortuitous factor of who happened to cause or be at fault in the
occurrence of an injury. Instead, benefits are paid by reason of the
victim's injury and the needs it creates, normally a much less contentious and costly issue to resolve.
Loss insurance, moreover, doe snot compensate all injuries imply
because they occurred in the way the liability rule specifies. Instead,
explicit social judgments are made about whether the loss in question is the type for which it makes sense to have insurance (medial
costs versus pain and suffering, for instance, or long-term versus
short-term lost earnings).
The amount of reimbursement of the loss is set in a way that is
more equitable in terms of how contributions are made to the program. For example, there should be relatively fault-rate replacement
of earnings if there is a relatively flat-rate mode of taxing those
earnings for the fund. In addition, the reimbursement is structured
in a way that is efficient in reducing the frequency and size of the
losses insured against, through deductibles or co-insurance that reduce victim moral hazard before and after the injury has occurred.65
Even granting the comparative advantages of loss insurance as a
mode of compensation, for two basic reasons we should be reluctant
to place all our reliance on that instrument. The first is the existence
of huge gaps in the social safety net in this country.6 6 The gap that
and Cooter and Sugarman, "A Regulated Market in Unmatured Tort Claims: Tort Reform By Contract," in id. at 174 (contracting before the injury); as well as our discussion
in Chapter 16 of the companion volume.
64. This is the argument of S. Sugarman, Doing Away with Personal Injury Law
(1989).
65. see Trebilcock, "Incentive Issues in the Design of 'No-Fault' Compensation
Systems," 39 University of Toronto Law Journal 19 (1989).
66. For a recent overview of our social insurance system, see T. Marmor, J.
Mashaw, and P. Harvey, America's Misunderstood Welfare State: Persistent Myths,
Enduring Realities (1990). The financial consequences of the serious gaps in this system
for injury victims are documented by the RAND study, supra note 36. As we show in
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 of this volume, the problem of underinsurance consists not in the
presence of deductibles or co-insurance for small short-term medical costs or earning
losses, but rather in the fact so many Americans have no effective protection for the more
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gets the biggest share of popular attention is in health insurance: 30
percent of all medical bills and 15 percent of the more sizable bills
of those who are seriously injured are left uninsured. But an even
starker gap confronts people who lose earnings due to injury. Most
people have some form of sick leave to protect against short-term
loss of earnings. But the private insurance market has been able to
satisfy for only a small fraction of workers the more vital need for
earnings replacement following serious long-term disabilities, when
savings are exhausted and the victim and family need funds to live
on.17 Admittedly, the Social Security Disability Insurance program
has established a reasonably adequate floor of support for those who
are permanently and totally disabled; for the last tow decades the
program has been under great pressure to expand to fill the gap we
have noted.68 But research about the economic consequences of disabling injuries consistently finds earnings protection to be the biggest
shortfall in our loss insurance system. So a major practical virtue of
tort (or workers' compensation) liability is that it mandates a sizable
infusion of insurance funds to meet this serious human need.
Granted, such tort insurance entails high administrative costs, and
tort law has long maintained a questionable relationship between itself and other "collateral" sources of loss insurance (for which we
shall propose a better accommodation in Chapter 6 in the companion
volume of this Report). But it makes little sense for critics of the tort
system to call for retrenchment of tort compensation on the ground
that loss insurance could do a better job of compensating injuries,
when we know full well that for the foreseeable future such alternative sources of protection will not be available for so many injured
victims.
D. Safety and Health Regulation

Even if the politically improbable were to occur and this Country
were to establish comprehensive medical insurance and permanent
partial disability insurance, retrenchment on tort law would confront
serious, longer-duration injuries that tend to lead to tort litigation.
67. The Evidence and likely explanations are presented in K. Abraham, Disability
Insurance and Tort Reform (ALI Background Paper, 1987); see also Chapter 5 below.
68. See Liebman, "The Definition of Disability in Social Security and SSI: Drawing the Bounds of Social Welfare Estates," 89 HarvardLaw Review 883 (1976); and E.
Berkowitz, Disabled Policy: America's Programsfor the Handicapped (1987). See also
Chapter 6 below.

another problem. By its very nature loss insurance ignores how injuries happen to come about and who is responsible for them. Under a
comprehensive insurance program, the prospect of the responsible
party's having to pay for injuries that could and should have been
avoided would no longer be available as an incentive to prevent such
injuries from occurring and thus from requiring redress from the
more generous loss insurance.8 9
That concern would be considerably allayed, however, if this prevention function could be entrusted to regulatory programs. In fact,
the last two decades have seen a huge expansion in administrative
command-and-control regulation for occupational safety and health,
consumer product safety, motor vehicle and highway safety, environmental protection, and medical licensing and discipline.70 The argument in favor of retrenchment in general tort liability is that in its
place we will get more effective and sensible prevention from specialized regulators, agencies explicitly designed for this function.
In theory regulation seems to have marked comparative advantages over tort as a mode of injury prevention. Contrast, for example, the procedures for arriving at their respective standards of
safety. Regulatory standards are established by experienced administrators, at the end of a rulemaking process in which a broad range of
affected constituencies can express their views and criticize options
that have been tentatively proposed. By contrast, tort standards are
adopted after hearing the position of only the parties to an adjudicative proceeding, by lay jurors who leave the courtroom after their
verdict, not likely to think about the issues again. One would never
dream of using such a process to design a car, a building, or a nuclear facility; why, then, use juries to evaluate the safety of these
complex items after they are completed?
In addition, in a regulatory regime administrators are required to
establish rules of behavior that can be communicated to the parties
before they act, giving regulated enterprises meaningful guidance
both for what they can do as well as what they cannot do. By contract, juries adopt only an implicit standard of appropriate behavior
as they apply the amorphous negligence concept to individual situations, long after the fact. Firms are forced to guess how this legal

69. For a valuable critique from this incentives perspective of the New Zealand
accident compensation program, perhaps the most widely heralded substitute for tort
compensation, see Miller, "The Future of New Zealand's Accident Compensation
Scheme," 11 University of Hawaii Law Review 1 (1989).
70. See W. K. Viscusi, Regulation, Tort Liability, and the Promotion of Health
and Safety (ALI Background Paper, 1990), on the emergence of safety and health regulation and a distillation of what we know about its impact (much of this empirical research having been done by Professor Viscusi himself); see also Chapters 8 and 13 of this
volume.
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process might turn out if they happen to be sued. Because the penalty for guessing wrong may be a multimillion-dollar damage award,
there is a real danger of overdeterrence when firms shy away from
risky but socially beneficial activities or products (in the pharmaceutical area, for example).71
Finally, regulation seems to offer a considerably more rational and

effective mode of enforcement. Rather than rely on the happenstance
that a private party will be injure seriously enough to find it worth-

while to sue, agency inspectors regularly monitor firm behavior for
compliance and file charges for violations even before any harm is

done. Such a proactive enforcement stance is especially helpful in
situations such as environmental exposures, in which the overall so-

cial harm may be large in the aggregate, but too small or too long
delayed in any one case to make effective use of the tort sanction.
Notwithstanding these apparent advantages of the regulatory process, the actual impact of command-and-control regulation has been

mixed at best. In a variety of empirical studies from the last two
decades of administrative regulation (in particular, of federal occupational safety and health legislation), the consensus seems to be
that although compliance with regulatory standards has exacted sub-

stantial costs from business, the payoff in injury prevention has been
disappointingly modest-considerably less than the prevention pro-

vided by liability systems such as workers' compensation for occupational injuries or tort liability from motor vehicle accidents. 2
What characteristics of regulation might account for these rather
marginal gains? A standard refrain from consumer groups is that
the law in operation is far too weak. Too few inspectors are available
71. For an argument that this did happen, see Institute of Medicine, Vaccine Supply and Innovation (1985), a study which helped influence Congress to pass the National
Childhood Vaccine Injuries Act of 1986, intended to channel vaccine injuries out of the
tort system and into an industry-financed, no-fault compensation system. A more recent
argument to the same effect but about contraceptives: Obstacles and Opportunities
(1990), in particular Chapter 8 on "Products Liability and Contraceptive Development."
72. This becomes apparent from comparing the results of Viscusi's studies of the
effect of OSHA (see his "The Impact of Occupational Safety and Health Regulation,
1973-1983," 17 RAND Journal of Economics 567 (1983)) and CPSC (see W.K. Viscusi, Regulating Consumer ProductSafety (1984)), with his much more powerful results
from no-fault workers' compensation (see W.K. Viscusi and M. Moore, Compensation
Mechanisms for Job Risks, note 55 supra), and Devlin's findings about the preventive
effect of tort law on motor vehicle fatalities (see R.A. Devlin, Liability Versus No-Fault
Automobile Insurance: An Analysis of the Experience in Quebec (Ph.D. Diss., University of Toronto, 1988)). On the other hand, much stronger and more cost-efficient injury
prevention results have been accomplished by motor vehicle safety regulation: see R.
Crandall et al., Regulating the Automobile (1986), particularly Chapter 4 on "The Effects of Regulation on Automobile Safety."

to monitor firms and file charges, by contrast with the tens of
thousands of private citizens who may be injured and can file tort
suits. Even when charges are laid and violations are found, the fines
are minimal, again by contrast with the typical damage award. Calculating the expected sanction for noncompliance with occupational
health and safety legislation, for example (the average fine discounted by the chance of detection and prosecution), seems to give
little legal reason for any business to comply with the law.
Yet while this critique is surely valid in some cases, it may not be
the most important explanation for the limits of regulation. Interestingly, it turns out that huge business compliance costs are in fact
produced by these supposedly toothless laws. 7 3 Apparently most
firms feel obliged to comply with regulatory standards for a variety
of reasons other than the risk and size of fines. 4 The larger problem
consists of the limitations in the standards themselves. First, we
should not overestimate the actual influence of administrative expertise on the judgment whether to adopt or how to define the content
of the standards. In the real world of administrative politics, such
standards inevitably bear the imprint of continual tugging and hauling between the affected interest groups, regulated firms, and representatives of potential victims. Vivid recent experience should leave
us with no illusions about the dispassionate quality of decisions
whether to escalate or relax regulatory attention. Whatever may be
the shortcomings of jurors' understanding of complex technical issues, one major comparative advantage of the starkly decentralized
tort litigation system is that
it involves no single body that is suscep' 75
tible to being "captured.
Even the most well-meaning agency will find that its formal legal
rule scan cover only a small fraction of the hazards to which people
are exposed in their day-to-day lives. The Food and Drug Administration may be able to pre-screen and approve every prescription
drug before it goes on the market (even though it does so with real
costs of delay), but such scrutiny is far from feasible for all consumer products. Similarly, although occupational or motor vehicle
73. See Bartel and Thomas, "Direct and Indirect Effects of Regulation: A New
Look at OSHA's Impact," 28 Journal of Law and Economics 10 (1985).
74. Many of the reasons are illustrated in the case studies of OSHA reported by J.
Mendeloff, Regulating Safety: An Economic and PoliticalHealth Policy (1979); and J.
Rees, Reforming the Workplace: A Study of Self-Regulation in Occupational Safety

(1988).

75. For interesting analyses along these lines, see Komesar, "Injuries and Institutions: Tort Reform, Tort Theory, and Beyond," 65 New York University Law Review 23
(1990); and Gillette and Krier, "Risk, Courts, and Agencies," 138 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1027 (1990). For revealing in-depth studies of the dynamics of administrative safety regulation in operation, see J. Mashaw and D. Harfst, The Struggle for
Auto Safety (1990); and J. Mendeloff, The Dilemma of Toxic Substance Regulation:
How Overregulation Causes Underregulationat OSHA (1988).
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regulation can specify appropriate standards that all firms must
adopt for common and recognized hazards, most workplace or motor
vehicle accidents occur as a result of idiosyncratic factors in specific
situations on the job or on the highway (or, in the case of medical
accidents, in a hospital operating room).
Safety and health regulation, then, like loss insurance, has proved
a valuable policy instrument for addressing important components of
the overall personal injury problem. as we will note later in this Report, the tort system should offer better recognition of and room for
the contribution that our elaborate regulatory programs make to injury prevention. But the inevitable limits on the scope and efficacy of
such ex ante regulation means that it can never entirely replace ex
post liability as a technique for influencing enterprises to take the
steps reasonably necessary to reduce the risks their activities pose to
others.
VI.

THEMES OF THE ALI REPORT

After spending more than four years analyzing and debating the
performance of tort law, we are fully aware of the limits and failings
of the institution. The compensation that tort provides is expensive
and often misguided. The deterrence that tort affords is muted and
sometimes misdirected. These sense of justice evoked by tort may
well be illusory in a world in which the real bearers of liability are
usually large corporate enterprises. The erratic quality of tort litigation aggravates both the availability and the affordability of liability
insurance, which we have come to rely on as a buffer against the
onerous burden imposed by litigation.
At the same time, as our research and analysis has proceeded we
have become aware of how many individuals are being injured on
the job, in the hospital, or while using manufactured products, and
how few of these victims actually take advantage of the rights supposedly available to them under the tort system. Our detailed exploration of alternative institutions for compensating and preventing
disabling injuries exposes characteristic failings that are too often
missed by tort lawyers, judges, and scholars preoccupied with the
flaws in their own regime. Notwithstanding its pronounced imperfecimportant umbrella
tions, then, tort law will and should remain an
76
institution for the victims of personal injuries.
76. See, to the same effect, ABA's Special Committee on the Tort Liability System, Towards a Jurisprudenceof Injury, supra note 2, Chapter 12.

It is one thing to endorse preservation of the core institution of
privately enforced civil liability of enterprises for unduly hazardous
activities. It is quite another to defend doggedly every feature of that
institution from challenge and reform. Doing os is most definitely not
our intention. In the companion volume of this Report we shall develop the case for a number of profound revisions in the present tort
regime. But we believe that the longer-range evolution of personal
injury policy must be informed by a broader, more pluralistic perspective than can be provided by an isolated focus on the tort system's shortcomings. We do not endorse the more radical scholarly
proposals made during the 1st decade for dispensing wholesale with
tort liability. However, we are conscious of the need to define more
sensible boundary lines between tort prevention and administrative
regulation on the one hand, and between tort compensation and public and private loss insurance on the other. We also propose relaxation of the constraints now imposed by judicially mandated tort
standards against such devices as contractual development within
competitive markets of alternative no-fault programs for compensation and liability of specific types of personal injury.
As important as the particulars of any of the proposals we make,
however, is the manner in which debate about these and other reform ideas can best proceed. Debate over any innovation must recognize how difficult it is to create a fair and sensible policy for
disabling injuries, to design a regime that satisfies the several competing objectives we need to pursue here. Inevitably, then, limitations
and imperfections will appear in any system as it operates in this
intractable real world. Tort law will remain a fixture in American
personal injury policy because there is no alternative institution that
can perform fully and ideally all of tort's functions. At the same
time, important constraints and efficiencies in privately enforced civil
liability have required the evolution and expansion of public law alternatives for compensation and prevention. The proponents of even
a reformed tort system must recognize and accept, then, that their
regime should play only a limited role in that larger picture. The
problems in tort litigation that were brought to light by the "crisis"
of the mid-eighties are still lurking beneath the surface. We must
seize this opportunity to reflect carefully on the strengths and weaknesses of the present regime, and to give a fair hearing to changes
that will capitalize on the strengths and ameliorate the weaknesses.
That, at least, is the spirit in which we produced this Report.

